The Great War and How It Arose — Background and Themes
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Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6 p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general mobilisation.
An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.
As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept."[5]
During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.
Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."
Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.
But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired.
The British Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:--
"I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Serbian rule."[6]
So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as 1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest right down to the Aegean Sea.
[1] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 30.
[2] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 4.
[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:--
The anonymous author of this 1915 pamphlet wastes no time establishing a prosecutorial tone. The opening section, 'Serbia's Position,' immediately cites a specific detail: one of the assassins of Archduke Franz Ferdinand had previously been in Serbia, where authorities 'had desired to expel him' but were blocked by Austrian protection. This choice of evidence frames the ultimatum as a pretext rather than a response. The pamphlet then reproduces the full text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, including the demand that Serbia publish a condemnation of anti-Austrian propaganda on the front page of its Official Journal. The reader is thus placed in the position of a juror examining primary documents from the start.
A Chronology of Failed Diplomacy
The pamphlet organizes its case around six numbered attempts to preserve peace, each presented as a discrete failure. The first is the effort to extend the time limit of the ultimatum; the second, a request to delay hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The third proposes mediation by the Four Powers, while the fourth asks Germany to state a form of mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The fifth records Russia's suggestion of direct negotiations, and the sixth is labeled 'Russia's Final Attempt at Peace.' This structure implies a sequence of reasonable offers that Germany systematically rejected. The author does not provide the text of these proposals, but the headings alone create an impression of mounting frustration. A reader should note that the pamphlet never quotes the actual diplomatic notes—it summarizes them, which limits independent verification but strengthens the narrative of German obstruction.
The Case Against German Militarism
After the diplomatic chronology, the pamphlet shifts to accusations of German misconduct in the field. A section titled 'How the Germans Make War' lists alleged violations of international law, including the laying of minefields on the high seas, the sinking of merchant vessels without warning, and the mistreatment of prisoners. The author quotes Lord Kitchener's comparison of German behavior to 'the barbarous savagery of the Dervishes of the Sudan' and reproduces a declaration by the Prime Minister that Britain would seek 'reparation against those who are proved to have been guilty agents.' The pamphlet also includes an appendix listing 'Some German Atrocities in Belgium' and another on Germany's use of poisonous gas. These sections rely heavily on official statements and committee reports, such as those of 'Lord Bryce's Committee,' which named three German generals. The reader should recognize that the pamphlet is assembling a legal brief, not an impartial history.
The Role of Official Documents
The pamphlet's authority derives from its repeated citation of parliamentary publications and diplomatic correspondence. The table of contents lists a full page of 'Parliamentary Publications respecting the War,' and the text frequently references numbered footnotes—though only a few are visible in the excerpts. For instance, the claim that Austrian authorities protected one of the assassins is supported by a footnote marker [1], and the ultimatum terms are attributed to source [2]. The appendixes include 'Germany's Knowledge of Contents of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum' and 'How Germany Misled Austria-Hungary,' suggesting that the author had access to internal communications. However, the excerpts do not reveal the actual content of these appendixes. A careful reader will note that the pamphlet presents itself as a digest of evidence, but the selection and framing are consistently one-sided. The absence of any German documents or counterarguments is itself a significant feature of the work.
The Pamphlet as Propaganda
Published by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee at 12 Downing Street, this pamphlet was explicitly a tool of wartime mobilization. Its purpose is not to educate neutrals but to stiffen British resolve by assigning clear blame. The language is often moralistic: Germany 'has stooped to acts which will surely stain indelibly her military history.' The final section, 'Germany's Attempted Bribery,' hints at economic warfare, though the excerpts do not elaborate. The pamphlet's anonymous authorship reinforces its official character—it speaks for the government, not an individual. Readers should approach it as a primary source for understanding how the British government constructed its narrative of the war's origins during the conflict itself. The document's value lies less in its factual accuracy than in its revelation of the rhetorical strategies used to justify British entry into the war and to sustain public support.
This pamphlet rewards a reading that attends to its structure as much as its content. The progression from diplomatic chronology to atrocity allegations mirrors the shift from explaining the war's causes to justifying its conduct. Readers may wish to compare the pamphlet's claims with the diplomatic documents it summarizes, many of which are now available in archives. The work is best understood as a contemporary artifact of wartime information management, not as a definitive historical account.
When I shelve that old 1915 pamphlet on the Great War’s origins, I sometimes think how its tidy certainty—the anonymous author’s clear chronology of blame—feels like a tightly drawn map. Yet The flying spy — Story, Setting & Ideas reminds me that truth often slips between official lines, hiding in the quiet, uncertain spaces where a lone observer watches the storm gather.
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